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Game theory for political scientists.

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Autor:	Morrow, James D.,
Título:	Game theory for political scientists /.
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P.imprenta:	Princeton, N.J. :. Princeton University Press,. c1994.. xx, 376 p. : 25 cm.
Notas:	Incluye índice. Referencias bibliográficas: p. [355]-363. Overview: what is game theory? What can you do with game theory? Four problems in political science. Why model?. The rational choice approach to social modeling. UTILITY THEORY: the concept of rationality. How do utility functions predict actions? An example: Nixon's christmas bombing. Certainty, risk, and uncertainty. Utility theory under the condition of risk. Some common misconceptions about utility. Theory. Utility functions and types of preferences. A simple example: the calculus of deterrence. Another simple example: the decision to vote. Why might utility theory not work?. SPECIFYING A GAME: formalizing a situation: deterrence in the cuban missile crisis. Games in extensive form. Games in strategic form. CLASSICAL GAME THEORY: defining the terms of classical game theory. Domination, best replies, and equilibrium. Mixed strategies. The minmax theorem and equilibria of two-person, zero-sum games. Characteristics of nash equilibria. Nash equilibria and common conjectures. Rationalizability. Political reform in democracies. Candidate competition in the spatial model of elections. A very brief introduction to cooperative game theory. SOLVING EXTENSIVE-RORM GAMES: BACKWARDS INDUCTION AND SUBGAME PERFECTION: backwards induction. Subgame perfection. Sophisticated voting. Agenda control. Legislative rules and structure-induced equilibria. The rubinstein bargaining model. Bargaining in legislatures. Why might backwards induction yield counterintuitive results?. BELIEFS AND PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA: Bayes's theorem. The preference for biased information. Perfect bayesian equilibria. Nuclear deterrence. MORE ON NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM: PERFECT AND SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA: Elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Perfect equilibrium. Sequential equilibrium. Deterrence

and the signaling of resolve. "Why vote?" redux. GAMES OF LIMITED INFORMATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON BELIEFS: Signaling games. The informationa

Descriptores_Es: Ciencia política; Metodología; Teoría de juegos

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